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Abstract
The poor performance of credit ratings of structured nance prod-
ucts in the nancial crisis has prompted investigation into the role
of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in designing and marketing these
products. We analyze a two-period reputation model in which a CRA
both designs and rates securities that are sold both to investors who
are constrained to purchase highly rated securities and investors who
are unconstrained. Assets are pooled and senior and junior tranches
are issued with a waterfall structure. When the rating constraint is
lax, the CRA will include only risky assets in the securitization pool,
serving both types of investors without any rating ination. Rating
ination is decreasing in the tightness of the rating constraint locally.
But rating ination may be non-monotonic in the rating constraint
globally, with no rating ination when the constraint is lax or tight.
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1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has prompted much investigation into the role of
credit-rating agencies (CRAs). With the dramatic increase in the use of
structured nance products, the agencies quickly expanded their business
and earned outsized prots (Moodys, for example, tripled its prots be-
tween 2002 and 2006). Ratings quality seems to have su¤ered, as structured
nance products were increasingly given top ratings shortly before the -
nancial markets collapsed. In this paper, we ask how CRAs inuence the
structure of such products, and how the products structure changes with
market incentives.
The structuring process is marked by close collaboration between issuers
and rating agencies. Issuers depend on rating agencies to certify quality and
to be able to sell to regulated investors. Beyond directly paying CRAs for
ratings (the issuer payssystem), Gri¢ n and Tang (2012) write that the
CRA and underwriter may engage in discussion and iteration over assump-
tions made in the valuation process. Agencies also provide their models
to issuers even before the negotiations take place (Benmelech and Dlugosz,
2009). These products are characterized by careful selection of the underlying
asset pool and private information about asset quality.
We present a reputation-based two-period model of rating structured
products. The model incorporates the endogenous structuring and rating
of securities. Each period, an issuer has a set of safe and risky assets that it
can put into a pool and issue securities against. A monopoly CRA assists in
the structuring of these securities and rates them. The prospect of earning
future prots can give the CRA reputational incentives to provide accurate
ratings.
We model reputation by positing that the CRA is long-lived and can be
one of two types: truthful or opportunistic. Securities are sold to rational
investors who cannot observe the type of the CRA or the quality of the
securities, but who make inferences from the payo¤ realizations, ratings and
the size of the asset pool. The type of the CRA is revealed between periods
with an endogenous probability that depends directly on the amount of rating
ination.
The issuer and CRA design securities that have a waterfall/priority struc-
ture, i.e. with junior securities that face the rst losses and senior securities
that pay out their promised amount until the value of the junior securities
has gone to zero. This is a typical structure for structured nance products
(Coval, Jurek, and Sta¤ord, 2009).
A principal motivation for securitization is to appeal to investor groups
with heterogeneous preferences. The senior securities are designed to appeal
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to constrained investors, who can only purchase investment grade securities,
i.e. securities with a rating above a certain level. Constrained investors may
be regulated institutions, such as banks, pension funds, and insurance com-
panies. The securities are designed using a rating constraint, a probability
that the senior securities will not be paid in full. This probability is exoge-
nous in the model, but may be determined by the requirements of the CRA,
the regulator, and/or the investors. The junior securities are designed to
appeal to unconstrained investors, such as hedge funds, who can purchase
securities with any type of risk prole.
The CRA may include safe assets in the pool to be able to sell to con-
strained investors. This creates scope for rating ination, which relies on
passing o¤ risky assets as safe ones. The trade-o¤ for the opportunistic CRA
is that this allows it to extract more rents from the issuer, who gets to retain
the safe assets, but makes it more likely that the CRA will be identied as
opportunistic and thereby decreases its expected future prots.
Our rst result is that, for some parameters, the equilibrium has both
types of CRA only including risky assets in the asset pool. This implies
there is no rating ination, as there is no scope for substituting risky for
safe assets. Nevertheless, through the structuring process, there will still be
senior securities to sell. And this achieves the rst best allocation, as there
are larger gains from trade for risky assets. This equilibrium will be more
likely to occur when there is less demand for safe securities, more demand
for risky ones, and the rating constraint is lax.
When the CRA includes safe assets in the asset pool, rating ination
is possible. Rating ination is important to examine as it is directly re-
lated to surplus. Rating ination (a) measures the amount of adverse se-
lection/misallocation there is, and (b) leads to excess risk being taken on
by investors (which, outside of the model, may be surplus reducing due to
systemic e¤ects).
We examine how rating ination depends on the rating constraint. For
parameters such that rating ination is possible, rating ination is decreasing
in the tightness of the rating constraint. First, a tighter rating constraint in-
creases the probability that the opportunistic CRA is discovered if it inates
in the rst period. Second, a tighter rating constraint increases the di¤erence
between the second-period prots when the inating opportunistic CRA is
not discovered and when it is discovered, making it more desirable to avoid
discovery. These two e¤ects dominate a possible increase in the opportunity
cost of being truthful in the rst period.
Nevertheless, given that for some parameters, rating ination is not pos-
sible, the relationship between rating ination and the tightness of the rating
constraint may be non-monotonic. When the rating constraint is lax, only
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risky assets are included, which, as discussed above, leads to no rating in-
ation. When the rating constraint is tight, there may not be any rating
ination due to a higher likelihood of being caught. Intermediate tightness
of the rating constraint involves positive amounts of rating ination. Inter-
estingly, this indicates that new markets that dont have many constrained
investors may not need to be heavily scrutinized by regulators. More ad-
vanced markets, consequently, deserve stricter scrutiny.
We show that rating ination is increasing in the wealth of unconstrained
investors, as it allows more risky assets into the pool, decreasing the likelihood
that ination is discovered. Rating ination is also increasing in the value
of retaining safe assets, as this makes it more desirable to substitute risky
for safe assets. Temporary increases in wealth or the demand for securities
increase the incentive to inate ratings to capture higher prots.
Finally, we provide two new motivations for the pooling of assets: (a) a
mechanical reason of tailoring products for constrained investors; and (b) a
novel explanation of the CRA balancing the informational advantage over
investors with the need to maintain its reputation by choosing the right mix
of safe and risky assets to include.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection, we review
the theoretical literature. In Section 2, we set up the model. In Section
3, we analyze the equilibrium of the second period and in Section 4 the
equilibrium of the rst period. In Section 5, we look at the determinants of
rating ination in the model. Section 6 reviews the empirical implications
of the model. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains all mathematical
proofs not in the text.
1.1 Theory Literature
In the theory literature, Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009), Fulghieri,
Strobl, and Xia (2014), Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013), and Strausz (2005)
examine dynamic models of certication agencies with reputation concerns.1
Our model of reputation is similar, but we allow for multiple risky assets,
which permits the CRA to tranche securities as well as rate them.
Daley, Green, and Vanasco (2017a, 2017b) examine the interaction be-
tween retention, security design, ratings, and origination. Ratings in their
main model are similar to public information. We focus on a CRAs strategic
incentives to undertake security design and ratings.
Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) examine how ratings-contingent regulation
1There is a large recent theoretical literature on CRAs, including Sangiorgi and Spatt
(2017), Cohn, Rajan, and Strobl (2016), and Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012).
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a¤ects the informativeness of ratings in a setting where a CRA rates risky
projects with binary outcomes. The constrained investors in our model rely
on a rating that states it respects a rating constraint. The rating constraint
may depend on regulation. However, the constraint may be violated in our
model by the CRA. Moreover, we allow for security design.
2 Model
There are three types of agents in the model: issuers, investors, and a CRA.
All agents are risk-neutral. We begin by focusing on issuers.
2.1 Issuers
The issuer has two types of assets that it would like to sell to a set of investors:
risky assets and safe assets. Risky assets pay o¤ ~X per unit, a random
variable distributed uniformly over the unit interval. For simplicity, the
payo¤s of di¤erent risky assets are assumed to be perfectly correlated with
each other. Risky assets are worth r 2 (0; 1=2) to the issuer. Safe assets pay
o¤ 1 per unit with probability one. They are worth s 2 (2r; 1) to the issuer.
The issuers valuations of the assets are lower than the investorsvalues
for the assets. This can occur for several reasons: the issuer may have valu-
able alternative investment opportunities, regulatory capital requirements for
holding the assets, and/or the need to transfer risk o¤ of its balance sheet.
The assumption that s > 2r implies that under full information the net prof-
its to the issuer from selling a dollar of risky assets is greater than the net
prots from selling a dollar of safe assets.
The issuers supply of safe assets is  > 0 and its supply of risky assets is
large (for simplicity, we assume it is innite).2 We denote the measure of safe
assets the issuer includes in the securitization pool by I and the measure of
risky assets by I .
2.2 Investors
There are two types of investors: unconstrained, U , with aggregate wealth
wU > 0 and constrained, C, with aggregate wealth wC > 0.3 Constrained
2Note that assuming that the issuer has a large supply of risky assets guarantees that an
issuer can create a pool of any size that contains only risky assets. This will be important
for the lemons problem we analyze.
3We assume that investors are credit-constrained, which might arise from borrowing
frictions (see, for example, Boot and Thakor, 1993).
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investors can only purchase securities that receive an investment grade rat-
ing. We dene investment grade ratings below. Constrained investors may
be constrained by regulations (for example, banks, pension funds, and insur-
ance companies are often restricted in the types of assets they may hold),
internal by-law restrictions / investment mandates (e.g., Baghai, Becker, and
Pitschner, 2018), or their portfolio hedging requirements. The unconstrained
investors are willing to purchase any security. These investors may be hedge
funds or other institutional investors. We assume that both types of investors
are rational, in the sense that they update given available information and
maximize their expected payo¤s.4 Investorsreservation utility is normalized
to zero.
2.3 Securitization
With the help of a credit rating agency (CRA), the issuer can issue securities
backed by a portfolio of safe and risky assets for investors through securitiza-
tion. We dene securitization as creating a senior and junior tranche with a
waterfall/priority structure. This means that if the payo¤ of the underlying
pool of assets is su¢ ciently large, both tranches receive a payo¤; the senior
tranche receives its promised repayment and the junior tranche receives the
residual. When the payo¤ of the pool is su¢ ciently low, the junior tranche
receives nothing, and the senior tranche receives the whole payo¤ (which may
be below the payo¤ promised to them). This model is a stylized version of
how securitization works (see Coval, Jurek, and Sta¤ord (2009) for a detailed
description of the process).5
Formally, suppose that the CRA in conjunction with the issuer decides
on the assets to include in the pool and how to structure it. To simplify
this process for the model, we assume the CRAs fee gives it a fraction f of
the surplus from the issuance.6 The issuer and the CRA decide jointly on
the number of safe and risky assets to include in the securitization and the
specication of the structure of the senior and junior tranches. For simplicity
of exposition, we will refer to all decisions as being made by the CRA.
More precisely, suppose the CRA can market the securities of a junior
4There has been much discussion about the naïveté of investors in the RMBS market;
e.g. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012). However, not all structured nance markets
are necessarily characterized in such a way, as Stanton and Wallace (2018) point out:
All agents in the CMBS market can reasonably be viewed as sophisticated, informed
investors.
5In a previous version of this paper, we modelled pass-through securities, where in-
vestors get pro-rata shares of cash ows from the underlying assets.
6We discuss the fee in further detail in subsection 2.4.
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tranche and a senior tranche. The junior tranche securities are intended for
unconstrained investors, while the senior tranche securities are intended for
constrained investors. Let zI 2 0; I + I be the face value of the senior
tranche i.e., the total payo¤ of the senior securities if they are paid in full.
The senior tranche securities are paid in full if and only if the payo¤ of all
assets in the pool is su¢ cient to make this payment:
I + I ~X  zI :
Dene xI as the realization of ~X such that the inequality binds:
I + IxI = zI :
For realizations x of ~X below xI , the senior tranche receives the total payo¤
of the pool and the junior tranche receives nothing. Notice that having the
CRA choose the face value of the senior tranche, zI , is equivalent to having
the CRA choose the cuto¤ xI 2 [0; 1]. As it will be notationally simpler to
use the cuto¤ xI , we do so in most of the paper.
The realized payo¤ of the senior tranche is thus:
I + I min

x; xI
	
;
and its expected payo¤:
I + I
 
1  xIxI + IxI  xI=2 (1)
= I + IxI
 
1  xI=2 :
The realized payo¤ of the junior tranche is the residual value of the pool:
max

I
 
x  xI ; 0	 ;
and its expected value:
I
 
1  xI   1  xI+ 0 =2 (2)
= I
 
1  xI2 =2:
From the above, it follows that the realized payo¤ of the entire pool
equals:
I + Ix
and its expected payo¤:
I + I=2:
Figure 1 illustrates the realized payo¤s of the two tranches as a function of
x.
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Figure 1: Pool payo¤ as a function of the realization of ~X for I = 0:2 and
I = 1. The payo¤ of the senior tranche is given by the red curve and the payo¤
of the junior tranche by the di¤erence between the black and the red curves.
2.4 The CRA
We assumed that constrained investors are constrained in the sense that they
may only purchase investment grade securities. We thus need to dene the
criteria a CRA uses for ratings.
2.4.1 Ratings
The simplest approach to dene the rating criteria is to quantify the prob-
ability of default. We dene an investment grade rating as signifying that
the probability the senior tranche is not paid in full is less than or equal
to an exogenous probability P 2 [0; 1].7 This gives us the following ratings
constraint:
Pr

I + I ~X  I + IxI

 P;
which, given the uniform distribution assumption, is equivalent to stating
that:
xI  P:
7We could make this denition more lax by stating that the probability that the realized
loss is larger than a pre-specied amount is smaller than the exogenous probability P . The
results are qualitatively similar in this case; the proofs are available upon request.
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It is natural to think of the probability of default of the senior tranche,
P , as exogenous to the given securitization problem. This probability may
represent the historical default rate for highly rated securities that the CRA
wishes to maintain, a more lax constraint that the CRA applies to securitiza-
tions, or a more conservative constraint that the CRA applies due to pressure
from regulators or investors. We will examine how changes to this constraint
a¤ect ratings.
To simplify the problem, we will use a transformed version of the rating
constraint:  
1  xI2  R  0;
where R  (1  P )2 : A higher R thus means a more demanding (tighter)
rating constraint.
Lastly, we assume that an issuer cant sell rated securities on its own.
It may sell securities, but without ratings it will not be able to access con-
strained investors. This is the rst role of ratings in our model; a regulatory
(or institutionalized) license to access certain clientele. Given this, the issuer
may still sell to unconstrained investors. As the issuer is short lived, it faces
a lemons problem, and can only include risky assets - if investors believed it
included safe assets it would switch them for risky assets. This is the second
role of ratings in our model; reputation allows the CRA to overcome the
lemons problem and sell safe assets. If the issuer decides not to deal with
the CRA, it then receives an outside option where it sells as many risky as-
sets/securities as possible to unconstrained investors, I = 2wU for a payo¤
of:
wU(1  2r): (3)
This outside option partially determines the fee paid to the CRA (which
is a share of the surplus).
2.4.2 Reputation
We focus on a monopoly rating agency. The CRA reduces the lemons problem
through the reputation it acquires over time. There are two types of rating
agencies: truthful (T ) and opportunistic (O).8 The opportunistic CRAs
announcement and its choice of tranche structure depend on its incentives.
The truthful CRA is behavioral in the sense that it (a) is restricted to truthful
announcements and (b) structures the securities assuming that all investors
8This follows the approach of Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2014) and Mathis, McAndrews,
and Rochet (2009) (who, in turn, follow the classic approach of modeling reputation of
Kreps and Wilson, 1984, and Milgrom and Roberts, 1984).
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believe it is truthful.9 The literature generally uses the behavioral player as
a device to create reputational incentives for the opportunistic player. In our
model, this limits the amount of rating ination that the opportunistic CRA
chooses in the rst period.
Our model has two periods. The CRA is the same for both periods. The
probability that investors place on facing a truthful CRA at the beginning
of the period is given by t, where t 2 f1; 2g. In period 1, the probability
is a prior given by nature, and in period 2, the probability is a posterior.
We assume the prior, the structure of the game, and payo¤s, are common
knowledge to investors, issuers, and the opportunistic CRA.
The CRA perfectly observes the quality of the issuers assets. As part of
its services, the CRA structures and rates the securities o¤ered by the issuer
for a fee equal to a fraction f > 0 of the surplus generated. We assume the
fraction f is exogenous and it is the same in both periods and for both types
of CRAs.10 The actual fee is paid when the payo¤s are realized.
There is a di¤erent issuer in each period. The issuer knows the type of
the CRA. Due to the surplus sharing rule, the interests of the CRA and
the issuer are perfectly aligned, and the CRA can easily signal its type (if
needed) to the issuer through the asset composition.
While in practice the issuer will initially structure the securities and get
feedback from the rating agencies about modications necessary to achieve
certain ratings,11 we incorporate this back and forth into one step for sim-
plicity. We dened the issuers outside option in equation (3). The CRAs
outside option is zero.
Denote a message that is sent to investors by a CRA of type d 2 fT;Og
by md = (d; d), where d
 
d

is the reported measure of safe (risky) assets
in the pool. Denote the true measures of assets by d and d. We assume
that the total quantity of assets d+d is observable. The term zd represents
the face value of the senior tranche, which is also observable.
In each period, an action by a CRA of type d is dened by sd = ( md; d; d; zd).
9We follow the reputation literature to assume a behavioral player. Nevertheless, point
(b) rarely arises in the literature. Hartman-Glaser (2017) is the only example we know in
which the behavioral player can make a strategic decision against another player/type (a
truthful issuer decides how much to retain of a security). In another version of this paper,
we allow the truthful CRA to be strategic in structuring the securities.
10Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2014) also use a surplus splitting rule.
11See details in Gri¢ n and Tang (2012). Rating agencies also provide their basic model
to issuers to communicate further. For example, Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) write,
The CDO Evaluator software [from S&P, publicly available] enabled issuers to structure
their CDOs to achieve the highest possible credit rating at the lowest possible cost. . . the
model provided a sensitivity analysis feature that made it easy for issuers to target the
highest possible credit rating at the lowest cost.
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Since we assume that the true total quantities of assets are observable to in-
vestors, any message md must fulll d+d = d+d. If the CRA is truthful,
then the strategy space is further restricted such that (T ; T )  (T ; T ).
In the model, the announcement of md and the observation of d + d
and zd supply investors with enough information to directly calculate the
expected values and probabilities of realizations of the senior and junior
tranches. The opportunistic CRA may substitute risky assets for safe assets
and thus worsen the actual payo¤s and inate ratings. We say that rating
ination occurs when the opportunistic CRA includes a larger amount of
risky assets than reported.
To summarize, the timing of the rst period game with is as follows:
0. Nature draws the type of the CRA. With probability 1 its truthful
and with probability 1  1 its opportunistic.
1. The CRA species the measures of safe and risky assets to be included,
the face value of the senior tranche zd, and that ratings will be pro-
duced.
2. The CRA reports measures of safe and risky assets (ratings) to in-
vestors.12
3. Investors observe the size of the pool of assets, the face value of the
senior tranche, and the announcement of the CRA, and buy securities
at their conditional expected value.
4. Payo¤s are realized and the CRA receives its fee.
We suppose that steps 1 to 4 are repeated in a second period. Based on
the message reported and the payo¤realization in the rst period, the second-
period investors update their prior about the type of the CRA accordingly.
If the messages of the two types of CRAs are di¤erent, investors can deduce
the type of the CRA with probability one. If the messages are identical,
investors update their priors by observing the realization of security payo¤s
at the end of the rst period. We describe this updating process in detail in
our analysis of the rst period.
In what follows, we work our way backward in solving the model, begin-
ning with the second period. We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as our
equilibrium concept.
12The actual ratings to be reported could also be included in the contract, without
altering the conclusions in the paper. However, such an inclusion could expose the oppor-
tunistic CRA (and the issuer) to lawsuits should the ratings not match the proposed asset
quality. As the type of the CRA is known to the issuer (see earlier discussion), the ratings
will be known by the issuer without contracting on them.
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3 The Second Period
In this section, we will analyze the second period of the game. Since this
is the last period, the opportunistic CRA has no reputation concerns. We
begin by describing the behavior of the truthful CRA, as it does not act
strategically (i.e., it doesnt take into account the fact that investors perceive
it to be opportunistic with positive probability). Note that the behavior of
the truthful CRA will be the same in both periods, as it doesnt recognize
the need for reputation management and the issuers in each period have the
same characteristics. Thereafter we derive the equilibrium behavior of the
opportunistic CRA.
3.1 The truthful CRA
The truthful CRA maximizes its revenues disregarding the behavior of the
opportunistic CRA. It solves the following program:
max
T ;T ;xT0

T (1  s) + T (1=2  r)  wU (1  2r)
	
s:t:    T  0 
1  xT 2  R  0
wC   T   T xT (1  xT=2)  0
wU   T
 
1  xT 2 =2  0
The objective function is the expected surplus generated by the CRA from
selling securities to investors. The expected fee is a fraction f > 0 of this
expression. The rst constraint is the resource constraint for safe assets. The
second constraint is the rating constraint, which implies that the probability
that the senior tranche will pay out less then its full amount is P or lower.
The third constraint is the budget constraint of constrained investors, which
makes use of the expected payo¤ of the senior tranche in equation (1). The
fourth constraint is the budget constraint of unconstrained investors, which
makes use of the expected payo¤ of the junior tranche in equation (2).
In the Appendix, we prove that the budget constraint of the uncon-
strained investors binds in any solution (T ; T ; xT ) to the truthful CRAs
optimization program, and moreover that any solution has T > 0. This
allows us to simplify the program considerably and to prove the following
proposition, where we make use of the denition W  wC + wU   wU=R,
which is discussed further below.
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Proposition 1 The solution to the truthful CRAs problem has the following
properties:
i. If W  0, the budget constraint of the constrained investors and the
non-negativity constraint for safe assets bind, implying:
T = 0;
T = 2 (wC + wU) ;
xT = 1 
p
wU= (wC + wU):
ii. If 0 < W  , the rating constraint and the budget constraint of the
constrained investors bind, implying:
T = wC + wU (1  1=R) ;
T = 2wU=R;
xT = P:
iii. If W > , the rating constraint and the resource constraint bind, im-
plying:
T = ;
T = 2wU=R;
xT = P:
The variable W represents the value of safe assets that the truthful CRA
prefers to allocate to the pool when all it has to worry about is the rating
constraint and the budgets of investors. When constrained investors have
more wealth, the truthful CRA nds it more protable to include more safe
assets and appeal to them. The opposite e¤ect holds for unconstrained in-
vestors. When the rating constraint is tighter (higher R), the truthful CRA
includes more safe assets to satisfy it. Since the measures of included assets
cant be negative, the truthful CRA will not include any safe assets when
W is negative. Finally, if W is larger than the supply of safe assets, , the
truthful CRA will include a measure of safe assets equal to this supply.
We will start by solving for an equilibrium where a positive amount
of safe assets are included in the securitization pool (W > 0), and re-
visit the case where only risky assets are included in the pool (W  0)
in the next section. Note that for W > 0, T = 2wU=R, whereas T =
min fwC + wU (1  1=R) ; g.
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3.2 The opportunistic CRA
In this subsection, we examine the strategic choices of the opportunistic CRA.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, any securitization rated by the opportunistic CRA
in the second period will only include risky assets in the pool of assets.
The lemons problem here has two elements. First, risky assets have a
higher margin than safe ones for the CRA. Second, investors do not observe
the actual composition of assets. Therefore if the opportunistic CRA includes
some safe assets and investor beliefs are xed such that they anticipate these
safe assets will be included, the opportunistic CRA has the incentive to
replace the safe assets with risky assets. This problem arises directly from
the existence of constrained investors - it is protable to include safe assets
in the pool (when W > 0) to be able to sell to constrained investors, which
then allows for rating ination (replacing safe assets with risky ones) to take
place.13
We say that the two types of CRAs pool at an information set where they
are both called upon to act, if they report the same messages, include the
same quantity of assets in their asset pools, and choose the same face value
of their senior tranches in equilibrium. If the two types of CRAs do not pool
at such an information set, we say that they separate.
Lemma 2 For W > 0, if the type of the opportunistic CRA is not fully
revealed in the rst period, the opportunistic CRA pools with the truthful
CRA in the second period.
If there were an equilibrium where the two types separated in the sec-
ond period in spite of a positive posterior, the opportunistic CRA would be
recognized, and would therefore only be able to sell securities backed by risky
assets. ForW > 0, this gives strictly lower revenues than the truthful CRAs
pool that included safe assets, and therefore there is a protable deviation.
It is easy to see that a pooling equilibrium exists for o¤-the-equilibrium path
beliefs such that any deviation is believed to be the opportunistic CRA for
sure.
13Note that this di¤ers from rating ination in much of the theoretical literature on
CRAs. There, the issuer usually has one good (NPV positive) or bad (NPV negative)
asset to sell/issue a bond against. Investors dont want to invest in the bad asset, and
rely on the CRA to screen the asset. However, the CRA may earn more by rating a bad
asset good. For examples of this type of model, see Fulghieri et al (2014) and Piccolo and
Shapiro (2018). Here, there are no bad assets, as risky assets are also NPV positive and
investors are risk neutral.
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For a given posterior 2 2 (0; 1), the corresponding second-period surplus
created by the opportunistic CRA is given by:
2(2) = 2
 
T + T=2

+ (1  2)
 
T + T

=2
   T + T  r   wU (1  2r) :
The revenues received depend on investors beliefs about the type of the
CRA. With probability 2, the CRA is truthful, and includes T safe assets
worth 1 per unit and T risky assets worth on average 1=2 per unit. With the
complementary probability, the CRA is opportunistic and includes only risky
assets, but ensures that the number of assets is equal to the total number of
assets the truthful CRA includes (T +T ). As these assets are all risky, they
are worth on average 1=2. The opportunity cost of selling o¤ those assets
for the issuer is the quantity of assets multiplied by their payo¤ if retained
r. Lastly, the issuer can earn wU (1  2r) by securitizing without the CRAs
help.
We can simplify this expression:
2(2) = 2
T=2 +
 
T + T   2wU

(1  2r)=2:
If the type of the opportunistic CRA is revealed to investors in period
one (2 = 0), then it will include only risky assets. We derive the optimal
tranching by the opportunistic CRA for this case in the following lemma (see
Appendix B for a proof):
Lemma 3 If investors know the type of the opportunistic CRA (2 = 0) in
period 2, it will include a measure O2 = 
T = 2wU=R of risky assets and no
safe assets in the pool. The corresponding surplus is given by:
2(0) = (1  2r)
 
T   2wU

=2
= (1  2r)wU (1=R  1) :
Notice that even though only risky assets are included in the result of
the lemma, the opportunistic CRA can still sell securities to constrained
investors, as they are made safer through tranching.
Lastly, we derive the di¤erence between the second period surplus when
the CRA is pooling and when it is separating:
2(2)  2(0) = T (2 + 1  2r)=2 > 0: (4)
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4 The First Period
In this section, we analyze the strategic choice of the opportunistic CRA
in the rst period. The following lemma demonstrates that there are no
separating equilibria in the rst period.
Lemma 4 There is no equilibrium where the opportunistic CRA separates
in the rst period.
If the opportunistic CRA separated in the rst period, it would have a
strictly lower payo¤ in the second period than the payo¤ from pooling (see
equation (4)). The truthful CRA makes the same choices in the rst period
as in the second period. Therefore, the opportunistic CRA can also guarantee
a higher payo¤ by pooling with the truthful CRA in the rst period, using
the logic of Lemma 2 and the knowledge that it will get a higher payo¤ than
separating in the second period. We can thus restrict ourselves to looking
only at pooling equilibria in the rst period.
In any pooling equilibrium, the opportunistic CRA chooses the same size
of the pool of assets as the truthful CRA (T + T ) and the same face value
of the senior tranche (zT ), but may include a larger measure of risky assets,
O1 .
A property of the uniform distribution is used here to simplify the prob-
lem. The likelihood ratio between the density function of the aggregate
payo¤ of the assets pooled by the truthful CRA and the aggregate payo¤ of
the assets pooled by the opportunistic CRA is constant for aggregate payo¤
realizations above T . Hence, if investors know the aggregate payo¤ realiza-
tion is above this level, then no additional information can be learned about
the type of the CRA from knowing the exact aggregate payo¤ realization.
Moreover, if the aggregate payo¤ could have come from either type of
CRA, then no inference can be made about the type of the CRA by observing
the di¤erent payo¤ realizations of the two tranches. The reason is that,
identical aggregate payo¤ realizations are split in the same fashion between
the junior and senior tranches created by truthful and opportunistic CRAs.
In conclusion, no inference can be made about the type of the CRA,
unless the aggregate payo¤ realization is below T , the minimum payo¤ of
the truthful CRAs pool, as this could not have been generated by a truthful
CRA. Given the distribution of the risky assets payo¤s, the opportunistic
type is therefore discovered (2 = 0) with probability:
Pr(
 
T + T   O1

+ O1
~X < T ) = 1  T=O1 :
The probability depends on the amount of risky assets the opportunistic
CRAs includes in the pool relative to the amount that it reports/the truthful
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CRA includes. As more risky assets are put in relative to the reported
amount, the probability of being discovered increases.
With the complementary probability, T=O1 , the type of the opportunistic
CRA will not be revealed by the payo¤ realization and instead investors will
increase their posterior probability that the CRA is truthful in the second
period to:
2 = 1=
 
1 + (1  1)(T=O1 )

:
In any pooling equilibrium, the opportunistic CRAs choice of the measure
of risky assets to include in the pool, O1 ; must be optimal given the rst-
period choice of the truthful CRA,
 
T ; T ; zT

. Furthermore, the beliefs of
investors are held xed when the opportunistic CRA chooses the amount of
risky assets to include, meaning that the choice does not a¤ect the revenues
received. We denote the amount of risky assets that investors expect to be
included in the pool by an opportunistic CRA by Oe1 . More specically, 
O
1
must be a solution to the following maximization problem:
max
O1 2[T ;T+T ]
8>><>>:
1
 
T + T=2

+ (1  1)
 
T + T   Oe1 + Oe1 =2

   T + T   O1  s  O1 r   wU(1  2r)+
2
 
1=
 
1 + (1  1)(T=Oe1 )

T=O1 +
+2(0)
 
1  T=O1

9>>=>>;
The rst line represents the revenues in the rst period. As the price
depends on the equilibrium beliefs of investors, and the quantity is observable
and identical for both types of CRAs, revenues are held xed in the decision
problem for the opportunistic CRA. The second line represents the issuers
opportunity cost of not holding on to the assets and the payo¤ it could obtain
without the CRA. The third and fourth lines represent the expected second-
period surplus, which depends on the probability that the CRA is discovered
or not. Note that the probability depends on the opportunistic CRAs choice,
as more distortion away from the reported value make it more likely to be
discovered. The equilibrium second-period surplus does not depend on this
choice, as the beliefs of investors about the updated type of the CRA are
held xed. Thus, the trade-o¤ for the opportunistic CRA is to increase its
payo¤ by retaining more safe assets and placing more risky assets in the pool
versus having a higher probability of enjoying future rents. Finally, as the
CRA receives a constant fraction of the surplus f in both periods, we leave
it out of the maximization problem.
Due to the assumption of a uniformly distributed ~X, the above program
is convex in O1 . To see this, note that the second derivative equals:
2 (2(2)  2(0)) T=(O1 )3 > 0:
17
Hence, we will have a corner solution. The two possible solutions are
(a) maximal rating ination, in which the opportunistic CRA includes only
risky assets (O1 = 
T + T ) or (b) zero rating ination, where the oppor-
tunistic CRA includes the same measure of risky assets as the truthful CRA
(O1 = 
T ). Under maximal rating ination, the posterior belief about the
probability that the CRA is truthful is:
02 =
1
1 + (1  1)T=(T + T ) :
An equilibrium with maximal ination can be sustained if the expected
surplus with the truthful CRAs amount of risky assets O1 = 
T is smaller
than the expected surplus with the maximal amount of risky assets O1 =
T + T under the beliefs 2 = 
0
2:
2(
0
2)  T s  T r 
T
T + T
2(
0
2) +
T
T + T
2(0)  (T + T )r:
Notice that here, the rst period revenues are the same in both scenarios
and are not included, as this looks at a deviation where beliefs are held xed.
The rst period opportunity cost of including assets di¤er, as the assets
included are di¤erent.
For zero rating ination, the posterior belief is equal to the prior, 1.
Therefore, an equilibrium with zero rating ination can be sustained if the
expected surplus with the same amount of risky assets as the truthful CRA,
O1 = 
T ; is larger than the expected surplus with the maximal amount of
risky assets O1 = 
T + T under the beliefs 2 = 1:
2(1)  T s  T r  
T
T + T
2(1) +
T
T + T
2(0)  (T + T )r:
The above implies the following equilibrium actions:
O1 =

T + T
T
for  (2(
0
2)  2(0)) 
 
T + T

(s  r)
for  (2(1)  2(0)) 
 
T + T

(s  r) (5)
The intuition behind these expressions is simple. If the current gain
from inating ratings (substituting risky assets for safe assets) is higher than
the present value of the future surplus from being more truthful, then the
opportunistic CRA prefers to inate ratings as much as possible. If the
present value of the future surplus from truthful ratings is higher than the
current gain from inating ratings, then the opportunistic CRA prefers not
to inate ratings at all.
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These expressions dene discount factors for which maximal rating ina-
tion and truthtelling are equilibria. Maximal rating ination is an equilibrium
when the discount factor is below a cuto¤, which we denote . Plugging in
second-period payo¤s, this cuto¤ is dened as:
  2 (s  r)
02 + 1  2r
T + T
T
(6)
No rating ination is an equilibrium when the discount factor is above a
cuto¤, which we denote . Plugging in second-period payo¤s, this cuto¤ is
dened as:
  2 (s  r)
1 + 1  2r
T + T
T
(7)
Note also that since second-period surplus is increasing in the posterior
beliefs, 1 < 
0
2 and thus  > , for W > 0. This means that there is a range
of  such that neither maximal nor minimal ination is part of an equilibrium.
For such , we conjecture that there are equilibria in mixed strategies where
the opportunistic CRA chooses maximal rating ination with probability
p 2 (0; 1) and zero rating ination with probability 1   p in period one.14
The posterior in period two if the opportunistic CRA is not discovered will
be:
mix2 (p) 
1
1 + (1  1) (1  pT= (T + T ))
Note that mix2 (p) is an increasing function of p such that 
mix
2 (0) = 1 and
mix2 (1) = 
0
2.
The opportunistic CRA will be indi¤erent between the two extremes
whenever:
(2(
mix
2 (p))  2(0)) = (s  r)
 
T + T

: (8)
Hence, for every  such that
(s  r)  T + T 
2(
0
2)  2(0)
<  <
(s  r)  T + T 
2(1)  2(0) ;
there is a unique mixed equilibrium p. We can solve for this equilibrium
using the indi¤erence condition (equation (8)) and plugging in the prots
from equation (4):
T (mix2 (p
) + 1  2r) = 2 (s  r)  T + T  ;
14Due to the convexity of the objective function, we can rule out mixed equilibria where
asset allocations with intermediate ination are played with positive probability.
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giving:
p =
1
1  1

1 + T=T   1
2 (s  r) =   (1  2r)T= (T + T )

: (9)
We have thus established the following results.
Proposition 2 If W > 0; in the rst period, the opportunistic CRAs equi-
librium choice is:
(a) inating maximally if   ,
(b) reporting truthfully if   , and
(c) inating maximally with probability p 2 (0; 1) and reporting truthfully
with probability 1  p if  2  ; .
Recall that for any W > 0; the measure of risky assets included by the
truthful CRA is given by the formula T = 2wU=R and the measure of safe
assets T = min fwC + wU (1  1=R) ; g. We make these substitutions in
the expressions for ,  and p in Appendix C.
4.1 Only risky assets
If W  0, the truthful CRA includes only risky assets. This implies that the
opportunistic CRA will not substitute safe assets for risky ones in equilibrium
and will include only risky assets as well. The opportunistic CRA will issue
the same type of securities as the truthful CRA in both periods and there will
be no rating ination. Even though there are only risky assets, due to tranch-
ing, there will still be a safer senior tranche (with xT = 1 pwU= (wC + wU))
and a riskier junior tranche.
Rewriting the inequality W < 0 as
wC < wU (1=R  1)
reveals when it is preferable to include only risky assets and not inate rat-
ings. First, when the wealth/demand of constrained investors is su¢ ciently
low there is little need to use safe assets. Second, when the wealth/demand
of unconstrained investors is su¢ ciently high, it is easier to sell risky assets.
Lastly, when the rating constraint is su¢ ciently lax (low R), it is easier to
create safe securities out of risky assets.
This equilibrium therefore will be more likely to occur when there is
less demand for safe securities, more demand for risky ones, and the rating
constraint is lax.
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In addition to the absence of rating ination, this equilibrium congu-
ration has the benet of maximizing the expected surplus given this set of
parameters, since the budget of the constrained and unconstrained investors
is exhausted, the prot margin is higher for risky than for safe assets, and
the opportunistic CRA will be hired in period two with probability one.
5 Rating Ination
Rating ination is a direct measure of surplus in our model. It measures:
 The size of the lemons problem: The rst best allocation is given by
the solution of the truthful CRA; when W > 0, it is optimal to sell
safe assets as well as risky assets. Distortions away from this allocation
reduce surplus. The opportunistic CRA cant resist substituting risky
assets for safe ones, but it is to its own detriment, as investors take
into account this behavior. The extreme form of this behavior is when
it fully inates ratings, and includes only risky assets. Reputation
allows the opportunistic CRA to partially circumvent this problem and
include some safe assets.
 How much risk investors are taking on: Regulators often outsource
the assessment of how much risk certain nancial institutions (banks,
insurance companies, pension funds) take on to the ratings industry.
We dont model directly why the investment grade threshold is impor-
tant, but its use in monitoring for regulatory purposes demonstrates
that there are negative consequences from circumventing the threshold.
Becker and Ivashina (2015) and Eng (2018) document institutions(in-
surance companies and banks, respectively) e¤orts to arbitrage ratings
by reaching for yield. Rating ination in our model is a measure of
by how much the opportunistic CRA is violating the investment grade
threshold - causing a buildup of risk and facilitating the reach for yield.
In this section, we will rst analyze the e¤ect of small changes of some of
the parameters on rating ination and, thereafter, large changes.
5.1 Local comparative statics
We use three metrics to measure increases in rating ination for W > 0:
1. There is no rating ination when   . Therefore if  increases, the
range of discount factors for which there is no rating ination shrinks.
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2. There is maximal rating ination when   . Therefore if  increases,
the range of discount factors for which there is maximal rating ination
increases.
3. In the mixed equilibrium ( <  < ), p is the probability with which
maximal rating ination is chosen. Thus, we interpret an increase in
p as an increase in rating ination.
We examine how the parameters of the model a¤ect rating ination in
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For W > 0, rating ination is:
1. Decreasing in the tightness of the rating constraint and the prior that
the CRA is truthful. Formally, p;  and  are decreasing in R and 1.
2. Increasing in the wealth of the unconstrained investors and the retention
value of the safe assets. Formally, p;  and  are increasing in wU and
s.
3. Decreasing in the wealth of constrained investors if W  . Formally,
p;  and  are decreasing in wC.
4. Decreasing in the supply of safe assets if W > . Formally, p;  and
 are decreasing in .
The above results follow immediately from the expressions for p;  and
 (see Appendix C), but we include a proof of the comparative statics with
respect to the prior 1 in Appendix D, since it is slightly more involved.
We highlight three intriguing results from the proposition and summarize
the rest. First, rating ination is decreasing in the tightness of the rating
constraint (an increase in R). There are two main e¤ects that reduce the
incentives to inate ratings. The rst is that a tighter rating constraint in-
creases the probability that the opportunistic CRA is discovered if it inates
ratings in the rst period. The second is that a tighter rating constraint
increases the di¤erence between the second-period prots when the inating
opportunistic CRA is not discovered and when it is discovered, making it
more desirable to not be discovered (and therefore not inate). This di¤er-
ence in prots increases because (i) a tighter rating constraint induces the
truthful CRA to include more safe assets (increasing the revenues for an op-
portunistic CRA who pools with the truthful CRA) and (ii) the opportunistic
CRA has a better reputation conditional on not being caught. These two
e¤ects dominate a third e¤ect: a possible increase in the opportunity cost of
22
being truthful in the rst period.15 The increase in the tightness of the rating
constraint may come from investor scrutiny or regulation, and is e¤ective.
Second, rating ination is increasing in the wealth of unconstrained in-
vestors. Increasing demand from such investors makes the truthful CRA
include more risky assets in the pool, decreasing the likelihood that an in-
ating opportunistic CRA is discovered. In addition, it reduces the di¤erence
between the second-period surplus when the opportunistic CRA is discovered
and when it is not. Thus an inow of money/investment (perhaps due to
easy lending) by unconstrained investors such as hedge funds can foster an
environment of rating ination.
Third, rating ination increases in the value of retaining safe assets, as
the opportunistic CRA will have a higher desire to substitute risky for safe
assets. The value of retaining safe assets may depend on the demand for safe
assets, which have extra value due to their money-like features and use for
collateral (Diamond, 2017).
We briey summarize the other e¤ects. Rating ination decreases in the
prior that the CRA is truthful, due to the increase in the period 2 payo¤
of not getting caught. In the intermediate case (0 < W  ), when the
constrained investorsbudget constraint binds, rating ination decreases in
the wealth of constrained investors. The reason is that their wealth improves
the second-period surplus, while at the same time increasing the probability
that the opportunistic CRA is discovered after the rst period. A similar
result holds for the amount of safe assets when the resource constraint for
safe assets binds (which occurs when W > ).
It is instructive to also examine the e¤ect on rating ination of period
one (only) wealth shocks. The shocks may be temporary uctuations rather
than permanent changes as examined above. This is also of interest because
wealth here may proxy for demand.
15A tighter ratings constraint makes the truthful CRA include more safe assets in the
rst period, increasing the opportunistic CRAs payo¤ from substituting safe assets for
risky ones. This e¤ect is overwhelmed by the e¤ect on the probability of being discovered.
To see this, note that the lower discount (upper) cuto¤ can be written:
T (s  r)
T = (T + T )
1
2(2)  2(0) ;
where 2 = 
0
2 (2 = 1). The numerator of the rst term is the value of substituting risky
for safe assets. When W 2 (0; ), this is increasing in R and there is a larger incentive
to inate ratings. The denominator of the rst term is the probability that a maximally
inating CRA gets caught. It is straightforward to see that this eliminates the e¤ect of
the numerator. This, of course, depends on the technology we have assumed, particularly
on the uniform distribution of the payo¤ of the risky asset.
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We denote wealth for the two types of investors in period t 2 f1; 2g by
wtC and w
t
U . Analogously, we dene W
t  wtC + wtU   wtU=R.
Proposition 4 For W 1;W 2 > 0, rating ination is:
1. Increasing in the rst-period wealth of unconstrained investors, w1U .
2. Increasing in the rst-period wealth of constrained investors, w1C, for
W 1 <  and independent of w1C otherwise.
Increasing w1U strictly increases the quantity of risky assets and weakly
decreases the quantity of safe assets included in the pool by the truthful
CRA (see Appendix E). This decreases the probability of discovery when
the opportunistic CRA inates ratings. It also reduces the posterior that the
CRA is truthful in the second period, which decreases second-period prots
in the event that the inating opportunistic CRA is not discovered.
If W 1  , the resource constraint binds and increasing w1C has no e¤ect
on the quantity of safe assets included by the truthful CRA. If, on the other
hand, W 1 < , then increasing w1C makes the truthful CRA include more
safe assets in the rst period. This improves the opportunistic CRAs payo¤
from substituting safe assets for risky ones.
5.2 Global comparative statics
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ect of large changes in R on rating ina-
tion. Dene (R) ((R)) as the lower (upper) discount threshold evaluated
at R. Assume  > (R = 1), and let R
¯
be dened implicitly by  = (R =R
¯
)
and R by  = (R = R) (in Appendix F we show that both exist and are
unique under this assumption). Figure 2 depicts the discount factor thresh-
olds in (; R) space.
Notice that these functions arent dened for all R. This is because when
W  0, the truthful CRA does not include any safe assets and hence there
is no possibility of rating ination. Dene R^  wU= (wU + wC), the value of
R such that W = 0. It follows immediately that R^ 2 (0; 1). In Figure 2,
R^ = 0:25, the point where the discount factor curves asymptotically approach
innity from the right.
Using Proposition 3, it is straightforward to derive the following propo-
sition, where we write p (R) to denote the mixed strategy evaluated at
R 2  R
¯
; R

.
Proposition 5 For any nite  > (1), in the rst period the opportunistic
CRA:
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Figure 2: The cuto¤s for the discount factor are depicted for the parameter values
wC = 3, wU = 1,  = 2:5,  = 0:1, r = 0:4, and s = 0:9. Assuming a discount
factor of  = 7, we obtain R^ = 0:25, R
¯
 0:584, and R  0:727.
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(a) reports truthfully for R  R^
(b) inates maximally for R 2 (R^;R
¯
],
(c) inates maximally with probability p (R) and reports truthfully with
probability 1  p (R) for R 2  R
¯
; R

,
(d) reports truthfully for R 2 [ R; 1].
This proposition demonstrates that rating ination may be non-monotonic
in the rating constraint R.16 For low R, it is more protable for the truthful
CRA to include only risky assets. Hence, there is no room for the oppor-
tunistic CRA to inate. For intermediate R, it is more protable for the
truthful CRA to include safe assets. Hence, the opportunistic CRA will in-
ate ratings, substituting risky assets for safe assets. For high R, part (d) of
the Proposition shows that ratings may return to being truthful. Here, the
truthful CRA will include more safe assets which makes it easier to discover
a cheating opportunistic CRA.
One might imagine that lax rating constraints prevail when nancial prod-
ucts are new and have little track record or established models to estimate
their risk. In this case the CRA will only include risky assets, but is still able
to create some safe securities from them. As these products become more
well understood, rating constraints are tightened, but that opens up the pos-
sibility of rating ination. Finally, if rating ination becomes too pervasive
and disruptive, regulatory and investor pressure may increase the tightness
of the constraint further, which could reduce rating ination.
Nevertheless, within the model (i.e. abstracting away from the externali-
ties of rating ination and risk buildup), the rating constraint is an additional
constraint imposed on the solution. Therefore, the solution with lax rating
constraint and no ination has higher surplus than the solution with tight
rating constraint and no ination.
6 Empirical implications
In this section we provide two sets of empirical implications. First, we ex-
amine evidence that supports the model. Second, we develop testable impli-
cations of the model that have not been analyzed in the literature.
16Note that if we change the assumption in the proposition to   (1), the opportunistic
CRA will still inate maximally for intermediate values of R, but it will no longer report
truthfully with probability one for high enough R. More precisely, if   (1), it will
inate maximally for all R 2 (R^;1]; and if (1) <   (1), it will inate maximally for
R 2 (R^;R
¯
] and play the mixed equilibrium for R 2 (R
¯
; 1].
26
There is substantial evidence of asymmetric information and strategic as-
set pool selection for structured nance products. Downing et al (2009) com-
pare the performance of pools of mortgages that are pass-through MBS with
no tranching with securitized REMICs (Real Estate Mortgage Investment
Conduits) with tranching. The extra layer of securitization and anonymity
in sales allows for a selection of worse performing pools due to private infor-
mation. This is shown to be true with ex-post performance data. Moreover,
there is a lemons spread due to rational discounting of these securities.
An et al (2011) show that portfolio lenders use private information to pass
o¤ lower quality loans to commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS).
Conduit lenders, who originate loans for direct sale into securitization mar-
kets do not select loans and hence have higher quality loans conditioning on
the observables. The analysis shows a lemons discount for portfolio loans.
This lemons discount is lower for multifamily loans, which have lower levels
of uncertainty and lender private information than retail, o¢ ce, and indus-
trial loans. Elul (2011) demonstrates that securitized mortgages perform
worse than portfolio loans, with the largest di¤erences in prime mortgages
in private (non-GSE) securitizations, consistent with the presence of adverse
selection. Ashcraft et al (2011) nd that the MBS deals that were most
likely to underperform were the ones with more interest-only loans (because
of limited performance history) and lower documentation, that is, loans that
were more opaque or di¢ cult to evaluate.
We nd that ratings ination is an important element of structured -
nance. Cornaggia et al (2017) nd that structured products are overrated
compared to all other asset classes.17 Ashcraft et al (2011) nd that as
MBS issuance volume shot up between 2005 and mid-2007, ratings quality
declined. Specically, subordination levels18 for subprime and Alt-A MBS
deals decreased over this period when conditioning on the overall risk of
the deal. Subsequent ratings downgrades for the 2005 to mid-2007 cohorts
were dramatically larger than for previous cohorts. Vickery (2012) shows
that ratings ination occurred for subprime mortgage backed securities at
all investment grade rating levels, not just AAA. Gri¢ n and Tang (2012)
show that CRA adjustments to their modelspredictions of credit risk in the
CDO market were positively related to future downgrades. These adjust-
ments were overwhelmingly positive and the amount adjusted (the width of
17Gorton and Metrick (2012) also show that AAA-rated asset backed securities have
signicantly higher cumulative default rates compared to AAA-rated corporate bonds.
This is also true for lower rating categories, but the di¤erences lessen as ratings worsen.
18The subordination level they use is the fraction of the deal that is junior to the AAA
tranche. A smaller fraction means that the AAA tranche is less protectedfrom defaults,
and therefore less costly from the issuers point of view.
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the AAA tranche) increased sharply from 2003 to 2007 (from 6% to 18.2%).
He et al (2012) nd that top rated MBS tranches sold by larger issuers19 per-
formed signicantly worse (prices drop more) and had higher initial yields
than those sold by small issuers during the boom period of 2004 to 2006.
The model gives us several additional predictions that we believe deserve
empirical scrutiny. First, we predict an absence of rating ination for a
su¢ ciently lax rating constraint. When structured nance products were
rst issued, they received little regulatory scrutiny and rating agencies were
still rening their ratings models for these products. Cornaggia et al (2017)
o¤er suggestive evidence that there was little rating ination before 2002.
Second, when the rating constraint is tighter, we predict positive but
decreasing rating ination as the rating constraint tightens. This is di¢ cult
to test, as there are few exogenous shocks to ratings constraints that we are
aware of. Nevertheless, Dimitrov et al (2015) examine the e¤ect of Dodd-
Frank on corporate bonds. They point to Dodd-Frank signicantly increasing
CRAsliability for inaccurate ratings and making it easier for the SEC to
impose sanctions on CRAs and to bring claims against CRAs for material
misstatements and fraud. This might be examined in the structured nance
context as well, though it would be faced with the confounding e¤ect that
the structured market dried up signicantly right after the nancial crisis.
Third, the model predicts that rating ination is decreasing in the prior
that the CRA is truthful. Baghai and Becker (2018) demonstrate that sub-
sequent to a drop in its business volume caused by a negative shock to its
reputation in commercial mortgage backed securities, S&P assigned higher
ratings than other raters, particularly for large deals and for deals from im-
portant issuers.
Fourth, our model predicts rating ination is increasing in the retention
value of safe assets. At the macro-level, the value of safe assets depends on
U.S. treasury bond issuance in terms of amount and maturity, the demand for
safe assets, and the supply of other money-like claims by the nancial sector
(see Sundaram, 2015, and Gorton, 2017). Fluctuations in treasury bond
issuance might be used to identify changes in the value of safe assets. At
the micro-level, the value of safe assets at nancial institutions may depend
on regulatory constraints (e.g., Becker and Ivashina, 2015; Eng, 2018; and
Merrill et al, forthcoming). Stanton and Wallace (2018) study a change in
the risk weighting of CMBS. Demir et al (2017) look at Turkeys adoption of
Basel II. Nevertheless, any test will have di¢ culty isolating the prediction,
as the retention value of safe assets to the issuer will likely be correlated with
19They dene larger by market share in terms of deals. As a robustness check, they also
look at market share in terms of dollars and nd similar results.
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the value of safe assets to the end investors, the supply of safe assets, and
the wealth of investors.
Lastly, the model states that temporary increases in unconstrained or
constrained wealth (i.e., an increase in the rst period), generally increase
rating ination. As we state in the text, wealth in the model may also
proxy for demand. Consistent with this prediction, many papers nd that
rating ination was concentrated in the boom years right before the latest
nancial crisis (e.g. He et al, 2012; Dilly and Mählmann, 2015; and Auh,
2015). In order to test this, one would need an exogenous wealth or demand
shock. One direction is provided by Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), who
detail that modications to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) over the past 20 years have gradually expanded the range of
structured nance securities that pension funds can hold. This could possibly
be used as a shock to constrained wealth/demand.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we derive the equilibrium of a simple model of security design
where a CRA with reputation concerns both designs and rates securities. We
show that the observed equilibrium outcome and rating ination depend on
rating quality constraints as well as the relative demand by constrained and
unconstrained investors. Intriguingly, for some parameters, the most e¢ cient
outcome (which has no rating ination), is observed for lax rating constraint.
The non-monotonicity of rating ination with respect to the rating constraint
may be an important concern to regulators. It would also be of interest to
study further possible systemic e¤ects of rating ination.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1 (The truthful CRAs
solution)
In order to simplify the optimization program, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 5 The budget constraint for the unconstrained investors must bind
in any solution.
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Proof: Suppose this is not the case. There are two cases to consider:
xT = 0 and xT > 0. In the rst case, by continuity, T can be increased
without violating the unconstrained investors budget constraint. Neither
will any of the other constraints be violated since none of them depends on
T for xT = 0. However, this implies that the suggested solution can be
improved upon since the objective function is strictly increasing in T a
contradiction.
In the second case, by continuity, it is possible to reduce xT slightly with-
out violating the unconstrained investorsbudget constraint. This relaxes
all of the other constraints except the rst, which remains una¤ected (if
T = wC and 
T = 0, the constrained investorsbudget constraint cannot
be relaxed, but this cannot be a solution since a strictly higher payo¤ can
be achieved by setting xT = 0; T = wC , and 
T = 2wU). Hence, after the
reduction in xT it is possible to increase T slightly without violating any
constraint. Once again, the suggested solution can be improved upon since
the objective function is strictly increasing in T a contradiction. 
Corollary 1 T > 0 in any solution.
Proof: This follows immediately from Lemma 5. 
The above allows us to solve for xT from the binding budget constraint:
xT = 1 
q
2wU=
T :
We can now simplify the optimization program by substituting for xT
and rewriting the rating constraint:
max
T ;T0

T (1  s) + T (1=2  r)  wU (1  2r)
	
s:t:    T  0
wU  RT=2  0
wC + wU   T   T=2  0
By the KarushKuhnTucker theorem, in any solution there are multipli-
ers 1; 2; 3  0, one for each constraint, such that the following conditions
holds, where the rst condition holds with equality if T > 0 and the second
condition holds with equality due to Corollary 1.
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@L
@T
= 1  s  1   3  0;
@L
@T
= 1=2  r   2R=2  3=2 = 0:
We can immediately rule out certain solutions by observing the following:
1. If 2 = 0, then 3 = 1 2r, implying that the budget constraint of con-
strained investors binds. Substituting in the rst rst-order condition
reveals that this must be negative and thus T = 0.
2. If 1 = 0 and T > 0, then 3 = 1  s and 2R = 1  2r  (1  s) > 0.
Hence, the rating and the budget constraints of constrained investors
bind.
3. If 3 = 0, then 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. Hence, the rating and the resource
constraints bind.
This means that we have the following possible solutions:
1. The budget constraints of the constrained investors binds and T = 0.
2. The budget constraints of the constrained investors and the rating con-
straint bind.
3. The resource and rating constraints bind.
4. xT = 0.
A.1 Only risky assets
If the budget constraints of the constrained binds and there are no safe assets,
we have T = 0,
T = 2 (wC + wU) ;
xT = 1 
p
wU= (wC + wU);
and the expected surplus is
(1  2r)wC :
A necessary condition for this solution is that the rating condition is not
violated. This holds if and only if:
wC + wU (1  1=R)  0:
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A.2 Budget and rating constraints binding
If the budget constraints of the constrained and the rating constraint bind,
we have:
T = wC + wU (1  1=R) ;
T = 2wU=R;
x = P:
The associated surplus is given by:
(1  s) (wC + wU (1  1=R)) + (1  2r)wU (1=R  1) :
A necessary condition for this solution is that the resource constraint is
not violated, which is true if and only if:
wC + wU (1  1=R)  :
In addition, the non-negativity constraint of T must not be violated:
wC + wU (1  1=R)  0:
Note that if the last inequality holds with equality, this solution is iden-
tical to the one with only risky assets.
A.3 Resource and rating constraints binding
If the resource and rating constraints bind, we have:
T = ;
T = 2wU=R;
xT = P;
and a surplus of
(1  s) + (1  2r)wU (1=R  1) :
A necessary condition is that the budget constraint of the constrained
investors is not violated. This holds if and only if:
wC + wU (1  1=R)  :
Note that if the last inequality holds with equality, this solution is iden-
tical to the one where the budget and rating constraints bind.
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A.4 Safe senior tranche
If the non-negativity constraint for x binds we obtain the following solution:
xT = 0, T = min f;wCg, T = 2wU , with corresponding surplus:
(1  s) min f;wCg :
A necessary condition for this solution is that the rating constraint is not
violated, but this is always true for xT = 0. It is also easy to see that the
budget constraint of the constrained investors is not violated. However, it
is straightforward to demonstrate that the payo¤ in this case is strictly less
than the payo¤ in all of the previous cases. Hence, this cannot be a solution
to the optimization program.
A.5 Comparing the cases
1. The budget constraints of the constrained investors binds and T = 0:
wC + wU (1  1=R)  0:
2. The rating constraint and the budget constraint of the constrained
investors bind:
0 < wC + wU (1  1=R)  :
3. The resource and rating constraints bind:
wC + wU (1  1=R) > :
These are the cases listed in Proposition 1. 
B Proof of Lemma 3 (Opportunistic CRA re-
vealed in period two)
Suppose that the opportunistic CRAs type is revealed in period two. What
securities would it sell if it were hired? From Lemma 1, it follows that
the opportunistic CRA would not include any safe assets. From analogous
arguments to those in Lemma 5, it follows that the budget constraint of the
unconstrained investors will bind, meaning that xO2 = 1  
q
2wU=
O
2 and
giving the following optimization program.
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max
20

O2 (1=2  r)  wU (1  2r)
	
s:t: wU  RO2 =2  0
wC + wU   O2 =2  0:
It is easy to see that this program has two solutions:
1. O2 = 2 (wC + wU) if W  0.
2. O2 = 2wU=R if W > 0. 
C Discount-factor cuto¤s and mixed equilib-
rium
C.1 Intermediate W
If W 2 (0; ], T = 2wU=R and T = wC + wU   wU=R. Substituting in the
formulas for the discount-factor cuto¤s and the mixed-strategy equilibrium
gives:
 =
2 (s  r)
1
1+2wU=(R(wC+wU ) wU ) + (1  2r)
wC+wU wU=R
wC+wU+wU=R
;
 =
2 (s  r)
1
1+2wU=(R(wC+wU ) wU ) + (1  2r)
wC+wU wU=R
wC+wU+wU=R
;
p =
1
1  1

1 + 2wU= (R (wC + wU)  wU)
  1
2(s r)= (1 2r)(wC+wU wU=R)=(wC+wU+wU=R)

:
Note that p equals zero for  =  and one for  = .
C.2 High W
If W > , T = 2wU=R and T = . Substituting in the formulas for the
discount-factor cuto¤s and the mixed-strategy equilibrium gives:
 =
2 (s  r)
1= (1 + 2wU= (R)) + (1  2r)= ( + 2wU=R) ;
 =
2 (s  r)
1= (1 + 2wU= (R)) + (1  2r)= ( + 2wU=R) ;
p =
1
1  1

1 + 2wU= (R)
  1
2(s r)= (1 2r)=(+2wU=R)

:
37
Analogously to the previous case, p equals zero for  =  and one for
 = .
D Proof of Proposition 3 (Local comparative
statics with respect to 1)
The only comparative static which is non-trivial to demonstrate is the change
in p with respect to 1. We prove that p is decreasing in 1. Dene:
A  1 + T=T ;
C ()  1
2 (s  r) =   (1  2r)T= (T + T ) ;
and note that A > 1 since T > 0. Using this notation, the mixed strategy
can be written:
p =
A  1C ()
1  1 :
This expression equals one for  = . Hence, we can solve for C ().
C () =
A  1 + 1
1
:
Di¤erentiating p with respect to 1 gives:
@p
@1
=
A  C ()
(1  1)2
:
We will show that this expression is negative. The mixed strategy is dened
for  2 ;  (at the boundaries it is degenerate), but since C () is increasing
in , it is enough to show the sign for  = .
@p
@1
( = ) =
A  C ()
(1  1)2
=
1  A
1 (1  1) < 0:

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E Proof of Proposition 4 (First-period wealth
shocks)
Suppose that wealth of investors in period t 2 f1; 2g is (wtU ; wtC). We will
consider the case where rating ination is possible, W 1;W 2 > 0. With
investor wealth varying over time, the truthful CRAs choice of asset pool
composition (Tt ; 
T
t ) will be di¤erent in the two periods. Plugging into the
upper discount threshold for W 1 > 0 gives:
  2 (s  r)
1 + 1  2r
T1 + 
T
1
T2
:
Since T1 = 2w
1
U=R and 
T
1 = min fw1C + w1U (1  1=R) ; g, this implies
that the discount threshold is increasing in w1C for W
1 <  and independent
of w1C otherwise. The upper discount threshold is strictly increasing in w
1
U .
The lower discount threshold can be written as:
  2 (s  r)
02 + 1  2r
T1 + 
T
1
T2
;
where
02 =
1
1 + (1  1)T1 =(T1 + T1 )
:
It is straightforward to demonstrate that  is increasing in T1 and 
T
1 .
This implies that  is increasing in w1C for W
1 <  and independent of w1C
otherwise. The discount threshold is strictly increasing in w1U .
Lastly, in the equilibrium where the CRA randomizes, the probability of
maximal ination can be written:
p =
1
1  1
1
T1
 
T1 + 
T
1  
1
2 s r
T2
  1 2r
T1 +
T
1
!
:
If W 1  :
p =
1
1  1
1

 
 + 2w1U=R 
1
2 s r
T2
  1 2r
+2w1U=R
!
:
From the last expression, it follows immediately that p is independent of w1C
and increasing in w1U .
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If 0 < W 1 < :
p =
1
1  1
1
w1C + w
1
U (1  1=R)
 
w1C + w
1
U (1 + 1=R) 
1
2 s r
T2
  1 2r
w1C+w
1
U (1+1=R)
!
:
Calculating the partial with respect to w1C gives:
@p=@w1C =  
1
1  1
1
(w1C + w
1
U (1  1=R))2
 
w1C + w
1
U (1 + 1=R) 
1
2 s r
T2
  1 2r
w1C+w
1
U (1+1=R)
!
+
1
1  1
1
w1C + w
1
U (1  1=R)
0B@1 + 1 1 2r(w1C+w1U (1+1=R))2
2 s r
T2
  1 2r
w1C+w
1
U (1+1=R)
2
1CA
  1
w1C + w
1
U (1  1=R)
+
1
1  1
1
w1C + w
1
U (1  1=R)
0B@1 + 1 1 2r(w1C+w1U (1+1=R))2
2 s r
T2
  1 2r
w1C+w
1
U (1+1=R)
2
1CA ;
where the last inequality follows since p  1. The last expression is clearly
greater than zero.
Finally, the partial with respect to w1U is:
@p=@w1U =
1
1  1
  (1  1=R)
(w1C + w
1
U (1  1=R))2
 
w1C + w
1
U (1 + 1=R) 
1
2 s r
T2
  1 2r
w1C+w
1
U (1+1=R)
!
+
1
1  1
1 + 1=R
w1C + w
1
U (1  1=R)
0B@1 + 1 1 2r(w1C+w1U (1+1=R))2
2 s r
T2
  1 2r
w1C+w
1
U (1+1=R)
2
1CA :
The rst term is positive since it equals p multiplied with the positive factor
  (1  1=R) = (w1C + w1U (1  1=R)). It is easy to see that the second term is
also positive. 
F Proof of Proposition 5 (Global compara-
tive statics with respect to R)
Lemma 6 For any nite  > (R = 1), there are unique values R
¯
and R
such that (R
¯
) =  and ( R) = .
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Proof: For R 2 (R^; 1], the functions (R) and (R) are continuous
in R since they are both continuous in T for T > 0 and since T =
min fwU + wC   wU=R; g is positive and continuous in R over the same
interval. It is easy to show that (R) < (R) for R > R^ and moreover that:
lim
R#R^
(R) = lim
R#R^
(R) =1:
Hence, there exists a 2 (R^; 1] such that  < (a) < (a). By assumption
 > (R = 1). The intermediate value theorem can thus be applied to the
functions over the closed and bounded interval [a; 1], proving existence of R
¯and R. Uniqueness follows since the functions (R) and (R) are decreasing
in R for R 2 (R^; 1] by Proposition 3. 
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